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Abstract We project medium to long term trends in labour force participation and employment 
for selected low- participation EU countries (Italy, Spain, Ireland, Hungary and Greece), with Sweden 
as a benchmark, by means of a dynamic microsimulation model. By exploring alternative scenarios 
to our baseline forecasts and their implications for GDP growth, we find that the gap between male 
and female participation is mostly explained by (i) differences in the individual conditional behaviour 
of older female cohorts, (ii) inadequate family policies. In particular, our results show that the condi-
tional behaviour of younger women in the low- participation countries is similar to that in Sweden. In a 
nutshell, what is needed is not a change of behaviour on the side of women but a change of mentality 
on the side of institutions and firms. JEL classification: C63, J2
DOI: https:// doi. org/ 10. 34196/ ijm. 00201
1. Introduction
Despite recent increases in female labour market participation, the female employment rate in Europe 
is still 11.5 percentage points (ppt) below the employment rate of men, with huge disparities among 
Member States. The employment gap is highest in Italy and Greece (19.4 and 18.3 ppt respectively) 
and lowest in Sweden (4.6 ppt), Lithuania (2.5 ppt) and Finland (1.9 ppt). Fostering the higher partici-
pation of women is crucial to meet the Europe 2020 target of achieving an overall employment rate of 
at least 75% by 2020; this in turn would be crucial to reduce the risk of social exclusion and poverty for 
women and to achieve inclusive growth (European Comission, 2013). In this framework, Richardson 
et al. (2018) present medium- and long- term projections of female participation and employment 
rates for a selected number of EU Member States (Sweden, Italy, Spain, Ireland, Hungary and Greece) 
and suggest that by 2020 none of these countries except Sweden will have reached the employment 
rate target (though Ireland will be close). In the present paper, we analyse the role played by some key 
drivers (demography, education, participation behaviour) and by some policy actions in shaping future 
female labour market participation in the same selection of countries, in order to obtain indications on 
which are the factors having the highest bearing in the unsatisfactory projected evolution of participa-
tion in those countries. To be more specific, we explore the implications of different scenarios for the 
parameters of the microsimulation model introduced in Richardson et al. (2018), and contrast these 
scenarios with the baseline projections for the selected EU Member States that were also presented 
in that paper.
To anticipate our main conclusions, we find that the gap between male and female participation is 
mostly explained by (i) differences in the individual conditional behaviour of older female cohorts, (ii) 
inadequate family policies. In particular, our results show that the conditional behaviour of younger 
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women in the low- participation countries is similar to that in Sweden. All this suggests that a change 
of behaviour on the side of women has already been achieved but it has not been accompanied by an 
adequate change of approach on the side of institutions and firms.
Before discussing our exercise and its results, a remark is important on the ability of the model to 
examine policy effects. The model on which we base our exercise is a reduced form one, estimated 
exploiting both within country variation and cross- sectional variation1. However, although these are 
reduced form equations, the inclusion of lagged values of individuals’ participation (as discussed in 
Section 2 below) can control for a large part of unobserved individuals’ heterogeneity as well as for 
persistence in individual’s behaviour. This will make the estimated parameters closer to structural 
ones and produce a reasonably reliable descriptive exercise about policy changes. Then the projec-
tions are made under the implicit assumption that the underlying structural relationships between 
variables on which the model is built will remain stable over the simulation period. They could indeed 
change either endogenously, because of feedback mechanisms that operate at scales not observed 
in the data, and therefore not considered in the model, or for exogenous reasons, because of the 
arrival of unexpected shocks (as a surge in migration flows) that modify both the characteristics and 
the behaviours of the population. Therefore, we stress that our projections should be considered 
as benchmarks, rather than forecasts: these benchmarks are useful insofar they point to the implicit 
consequences of the dynamics that are currently under way in the society, and that could trigger or 
require at some point in the future the activation of corrective mechanisms. Such benchmarks allow us 
to investigate, par différence, the effects of specific scenario or policy parameters, and the determi-
nants of the results. This is what we do when we contrast the results obtained in the baseline scenario 
with those obtained under alternative scenarios. To the best of our knowledge, there is no straight-
forward way of improving on this. A structural labour supply model based on a tax- benefit model 
(EUROMOD) may be a challenging way to improve on it, and it is high on our agenda for the future. 
However, we reckon the present exercise interesting and informative in a descriptive – not normative 
1. The latter is used mostly for policy parameters, as within country variation in policy settings over time is quite 
limited in the short run. In doing so we obtain average policy effects computed over 6 countries whose heterogenei-
ty provides the needed variability.
Figure 1. Model structure
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– way, as it is a way of showing which determinants have the highest bearing on the dynamics of the 
long run trends in female participation and occupation rates.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we briefly describe the model and the baseline 
scenario; in Section 3 we describe the different scenarios under investigation; in Section 4 we analyse, 
country by country, the baseline drivers, while Section 5 is devoted to policy actions scenarios. Section 
6 concludes. The Appendix reports further details on the model and the baseline scenario.
2. The model and the baseline scenario
As anticipated, the countries we analyse have been selected because they are among the most prob-
lematic in terms of female participation and employment rates, as well as in terms of gender (in)
equality. Sweden has been included as a high participation benchmark. The microsimulation model is 
comprised of four different modules, as plotted in Figure 12: (i) Demography, (ii) Education, (iii) House-
hold composition, and (iv) Labour market. In each period, agents first go through the Demographic 
module, which deals with evolving the population structure by age, gender and area, based on 
Eurostat official demographic projections. Then, individuals above an individual- specific age threshold 
retire. Retired individuals remain in the simulation until they die but nothing else happens to them, 
except the ageing process. Students enter the Education module. If they remain in education, nothing 
else happens to them until the next period. If they exit education, they join the ranks of potentially 
active individuals. Females enter the Household composition module, where it is determined whether 
they form or remain in a union and whether they give birth to a child. Then, they join males in the 
Labour market module, where participation and employment are finally determined.
In choosing the specifications for the different equations that contribute to determine participation 
patterns, we looked at the ‘usual suspects’ identified in the literature (see Del Boca and Wetzels, 
2007, and Boeri et al., 2008 for surveys, but also see for instance Saurel- Cubizolles et al., 1999; 
Bratti et al., 2005; Attanasio et al., 2008; Genre et al., 2010; Cipollone and D’Ippoliti, 2011), as 
well as at policies. Thévenon (2011) performs a principal component analysis aimed at identifying 
2. The microsimulation model is described in details in Richardson et al., (2018) as well as – more briefly – in the 
Appendix to the present work. It is developed using the JAS- mine simulation platform (Richiardi and Richard-
son, 2017) available open source from the JAS- mine website (see http://www.jas- mine.net/demo/labour- force- 
participation).
Table 1. Determinants of the estimated processes at an individual level. Determinants annotated 
with (t-1) symbolise that the one- period (one year) lag is used
Outcome Determinants
Student age, gender, region
Education age, gender, region
Consensual union (female only) age, student(t-1), education, participation(t-1), 
cohabitation(t-1), children(t-1), region, retired(t-1)
Maternity (female only) age, student(t-1), education, participation(t-1), 
cohabitation(t-1), children(t-1), region, fertility rate, 
public childcare, maternity benefits, part- time rate
Participation: women with children aged 0–3 inclusive age, student(t-1), education, participation(t-1), 
cohabitation(t-1), region, public childcare, maternity 
benefits, part- time rate, post- crisis dummy
Participation: women with children aged 4–12 inclusive age, student(t-1), education, participation(t-1), 
cohabitation(t-1), region, part- time rate, post- crisis 
dummy
Participation: women without children aged 0–12 inclusive age, student(t-1), education, participation(t-1), 
cohabitation(t-1), region, post- crisis dummy
Participation: men age, student(t-1), education, participation(t-1), region, 
post- crisis dummy
Employment age, gender, student(t-1), education, participation(t-1), 
unemployment rate, region, post- crisis dummy
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the most important characteristics of family policy packages in OECD countries. He finds two main 
components: one related to support allowing parents to combine work with childcare, and another 
related to the generosity of leave entitlements in terms of money and duration. We draw from this 
literature, to choose the baseline scenario and the different parametrization, listed in Table 1 (policy 
parameters highlighted in italics)3.
Although these are reduced form equations, the inclusion of lagged values of individuals’ participa-
tion can control for a large part of unobserved individuals’ heterogeneity as well as for persistence in 
individual’s behaviour. This will make the estimated parameters closer to structural ones and produce 
a reasonably reliable descriptive exercise about policy changes.
As a final remark, notice that employment rates are computed in the microsimulation conditional 
on participation and do not feed back into the evolution of the other variables. I.e., differences in 
employment rates are entirely explained by differences in participation rates, for given parameters 
controlling the speed of recovery from the Great Recession.4 Hence, in presenting the results we will 
focus mainly on participation rates; employment rates will be discussed for the scenarios involving a 
change in parameters related to the recovery from the Great Recession only.
Participation rates projected according to the baseline scenario will be plotted in the result sections 
4 and 5, along with the participation rates projected according to the different scenarios discussed in 
the next section.
3. The alternative scenarios
They are chosen with two objectives in mind. First, we wish to offer a better comprehension of the drivers 
of the baseline results, by deliberately “switching off” country- specific differences one at a time. Hence, 
we analyse what happens in the low participation countries (Italy, Spain, Greece, Hungary and Ireland) 
when we endow them with ‘Swedish features’, from demographic evolution, to educational attainments 
and conditional participation behaviour of women. Second, we wish to investigate the effects of key 
parameters which might be affected by policies. These involve the speed of recovery from the Great 
Recession, the suppression of early retirement opportunities, and more favourable family policies.
We will label the two sets of different parameterisations baseline drivers and policy actions, respec-
tively, though the distinction between the two sets is fuzzy and mainly concerns the choice of the 
parameters values: when analysing the baseline drivers, we set the relevant parameters to “extreme” 
values (those of the benchmark country, which are generally implausible for the other countries), while 
when we investigate policy actions we choose “reasonable” values for the parameters. This because 
we acknowledge that policies might also affect the baseline drivers – for instance, by modifying the 
incentives that shape fertility rates, migration flows, or educational choices. To address this issue, 
starting from the “extreme” Swedish values for – e.g. – educational attainments, we elaborate on the 
responsiveness of the model outcomes with respect to more “reasonable” educational levels, in order 
to provide an idea of the effects of more realistic educational policies.
Notice that, when analysing baseline drivers we are not in the position to decompose exactly the total 
projected change in participation and employment rates into their different causal pathways, as changing 
parameters in turns, as described, prevents us to compute exact shares of the differences in outcomes 
between the low participation countries and Sweden, as they do not sum up mechanically to one. To do 
so we would have needed an Oaxaca- Blinder decomposition exercise, but the cost of doing so would 
have been to prevent us to analyse the impact of these differences in the model projections. However, in 
pursuing our strategy, we can nevertheless provide an intuitive way of discriminating between more and 
3. The model simulates the following state variables of the individuals: age, gender, region, educational attainment, 
labour market status (student, employed, unemployed, retired or other inactive), cohabitation status (for females 
only), and number and age of children (for females only). It is estimated for the 6 mentioned countries based on the 
2005–2011 waves of the EU- SILC longitudinal panel. The initial population is an extraction from the 2011 wave of the 
EU- SILC cross- sectional data.
4. The relationship between participation and employment rates is given by the following equation:
EMPL_RATE = #EMPLOYED / POP = #ACTIVE (1- u) / POP = PART_RATE (1- u)
where EMPL_RATE is the employment rate, PART_RATE is the participation rate, #EMPLOYED is the number of 
employed individuals, #ACTIVE is the number of active individuals participating in the labour market, POP is the 
working age population and u is the aggregate unemployment rate, a scenario parameter in the model. Hence, 
given a value of u, a higher participation rate translates one- to- one into a higher employment rate.
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less important channels, focussing on the relative 
size of these differences.
3.1. Baseline drivers
3.1.1 swedish participation
The Swedish participation scenario is meant to 
disentangle the effects of individual character-
istics from composition effects, in explaining 
participation rates. For instance, having small 
children negatively affects female participation, 
to a degree which is estimated in the data and is 
country- specific. The (country- specific) estimated 
coefficients measure the effects of the covariates 
(having versus not having small children in our 
example) on the outcome.5 On top of the differ-
ences in the estimated coefficients, countries also 
differ with respect to the fraction of women with 
small children, and in their characteristics (age, 
education, etc.), that is in the composition of 
the population with respect to the determinants 
of the outcome of interest. The Swedish partici-
pation scenario assumes that in all countries, all 
covariates have the same effect as in Sweden, 
with respect to participation. Hence, differences 
in outcomes must be attributed to composition 
effects only. While in the Swedish demography 
and the Swedish education scenarios described 
below we keep population characteristics fixed to 
Swedish levels, here we keep their effects fixed to 
Swedish levels, and keep the country- specific population characteristics as in the baseline.6 Hence the 
Swedish participation scenario allows us to answer the following questions: What would happen in 
country X if individuals were to behave as in Sweden, with respect to their labour force participation 
5. The estimated coefficients are also referred to in the econometric literature as returns to the covariates. The 
rationale for using the term ‘returns’ is better understood when thinking of monetary variables like income (which are 
absent in the microsimulation model), where for instance high education commands a positive return (a premium).
6. The values of the estimated coefficients are reported in Appendix A of our companion paper.
Table 2. Projected old- age dependency ratio, 
baseline scenario
Old- age dependency rates (%)
Year 2015 2020 2030 2040 2050
Ireland 19.8 23.2 30.3 38.6 44.8
Hungary 26.4 30.5 34.4 39.8 47.3
Spain 27.8 30.4 39.6 53.5 62.5
Sweden 31.2 33.0 35.5 37.4 37.5
Greece 31.9 34.3 41.2 53.2 63.6
Italy 33.3 34.9 40.8 49.9 52.9
Source: Eurostat – Population Projections 
EUROPOP2013.
Table 3. Share of people aged 18–65 years with 
high (ISCED level 3) and low (ISCED level 1) 
education, base year
High education (%) Low education (%)
Females Males Females Males
Italy 16.8 13.5 37.3 38.9
Hungary 21.6 15.1 24.8 21.2
Greece 22.8 20.8 35.6 34.2
Spain 30.4 26.6 44.7 48.8
Ireland 33.0 35.3 29.1 34.2
Sweden 38.4 26.5 13.6 17.0
Table 4. Assumptions concerning the mean and standard deviation of retirement age (prior to 
imposing the minimum retirement age constraint)
Mean retirement age Std. deviation
Year 2015 2030 2050
Males Females Males Females Males Females Males Females
Hungary 61.1 61.8 64.9 65.3 70.0 70.0 5.1 4.1
Greece 62.8 60.0 65.9 64.3 70.0 70.0 5.8 6.2
Spain 63.3 63.8 66.2 66.5 70.0 70.0 4.7 4.5
Italy 64.0 65.9 66.6 67.7 70.0 70.0 6.5 6.6
Ireland 65.8 63.1 67.6 66.0 70.0 70.0 3.5 4.5
Sweden 66.6 65.8 68.0 67.6 70.0 70.0 3.4 3.8
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decisions? Is it behaviour (conditional on characteristics), or is it the characteristics of the population in 
terms of the distribution of individual traits, that matters the most in explaining the outcome?7
3.1.2. swedish demography
In the Swedish demography scenario, the demographic evolution is the same as in Sweden8. Table 2 
reports the projected evolution of the old- age dependency ratio (the ratio between the projected number 
of persons aged over 65 years and the projected number of persons aged between 15 and 64 years, 
expressed per 100 persons aged 15–64 years) in the baseline scenario, ordered from lowest (Ireland) to 
highest (Italy) in 2015. Sweden is the country which is closest to a demographic equilibrium, with an old- 
age dependency ratio that is projected to grow only moderately over the forecasting horizon: from being 
in the middle of the ranking in 2015, it is expected to become the country with the lowest ratio among 
the selected countries from 2040 onwards. This reinforces the choice of Sweden as a benchmark.
3.1.3. Swedish education
In the Swedish education scenario, the distribution of educational attainments is the same as in Sweden. 
Table 3 reports the share of individuals with respectively high and low levels of education, in the baseline 
scenario, in the base year of the simulation. Sweden is the country with the highest (lowest) proportion 
of people with high (low) education. In the Swedish education scenario, initial educational attainments 
are modified to reflect the same distribution of educational levels as in Sweden. Then, the share of highly 
educated individuals increases, in all countries, as predicted in the aggregate projections presented in 
Richardson et al. (2018), at the expenses of the share of poorly educated individuals.
3.2. Policy actions
3.2.1. Delayed recovery
In the Delayed recovery scenario we assume that the effects of the Great Recession on participation 
and employment fade away more slowly. The Great Recession enters the model in two ways. First, we 
introduced a flag that signals the presence of the crisis in the participation and employment equa-
tions, which is set to zero in the estimation data prior to 2009 and set to one from 2009 onwards: the 
estimated coefficient of this flag measures, in each country, the strength of the effects of the crisis. 
Second, the aggregate unemployment rate that enters the employment equation is measured in the 
estimation data and also reflects the effects of the crisis. In the simulations, the estimated coefficient 
of the flag is kept constant, but the flag itself, signalling the presence of the crisis, is allowed to 
“shrink” towards zero. In the baseline scenario, the value of this flag decreases linearly from one to 
zero, and reaches zero in 2020 (2030 in Greece). The aggregate unemployment rate is also assumed 
to decrease linearly to pre- crisis levels, which are reached in 2020 (2030 in Greece). Hence, in the 
baseline scenario the Great Recession is assumed to be completely over by 2020 (2030 in Greece). In 
the Delayed recovery scenario this is postponed by 10 years, to 2030 in all countries except Greece, 
where recovery is complete by 2040.
3.2.2. No early retirement
In this scenario, the minimum retirement age is set to 60 years old in all countries (the baseline value 
is 45). Note however that because retirement age is randomly drawn for each individual from a normal 
distribution with mean equal to the average (expected) retirement age, and standard deviation equal 
to the standard deviation in retirement age observed in the estimation data (Table 4), there are only a 
minority of people for which the minimum retirement age constraint is binding.
7. As already discussed, the decision to focus on participation stems from the centrality of participation in the mod-
el: employment, the other outcome of interest, is computed on the basis of participation, conditional on individual 
characteristics but aligned to match externally provided aggregate projections (variation of these scenario parame-
ters is explored in the Delayed recovery scenario, see below).
8. The Demographic module ages all individuals in the population and then passively aligns the population to 
Eurostat projections, by gender, age and simulation time. This means that at each simulated time the simulated pop-
ulation is partitioned by gender and age. The size of each resulting cell is then compared and aligned to the Eurostat 
projections. In this scenario we pretend that all countries are Sweden.
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3.2.3. enhanced family policies
In the Enhanced family policies scenario we consider that the duration of maternity leave, the amount 
of public childcare expenditures per child, and the overall diffusion of part- time arrangements among 
employed workers all increase by 20% with respect to the baseline scenario. The values for the base-
line scenario, taken from the OECD Family Database and kept constant throughout the simulations, 
and reported in Table 5.
The Enhanced family policies scenario is then disaggregated in three sub- scenarios, where each 
component in turn (maternity leave, public childcare expenditures, and part- time rate) is increased by 
20%, while leaving the others unchanged.
As a final caveat, we acknowledge that key “policy relevant” parameters might be only partially 
under the control of the regulators – this holds, for example, for the path of recovery from the Great 
Recession since 2009 and for the availability of part- time opportunities. Changing parameters that are 
not directly set by policy levers should be interpreted as providing an investigation of the space for 
policy intervention, where the effects of specific policies on the target variables should be the object 
of further analysis.
4. Results. The baseline drivers scenarios
The objective of this analysis is to identify the main drivers of the female participation gaps of the 
low- participation countries with respect to Sweden. These gaps, in the baseline scenario, are quite 
remarkable, going from 15.5 ppt in Spain to 27.4 ppt in Italy at the beginning of the simulation period, 
and reducing only slightly over time (Table 69).
Figure 2 reports, for each country, the projected participation rates in the three baseline drivers 
scenarios: demographic evolution, educational attainments, and participation behaviour. The shaded 
areas in grey in the background represent uncertainty around the baseline projections, against which 
each scenario can be evaluated.10
In all countries, the gap in female participation with respect to Sweden is explained mostly by 
differences in the individual conditional behaviour, rather than in the composition of the population: 
ceteris paribus, conditional on individual characteristics, Swedish women are more active. This can be 
seen from the projections in the Swedish participation scenario, which are consistently and significantly 
higher than the baseline (5–10 ppt in Spain, Greece and Ireland; 10–15 ppt in Italy and Hungary). If 
women in Italy, Spain and Greece would have the same labour market behaviour of Swedish women, 
9. Also Appendix B of our companion paper.
10. Assessing the statistical significance of the differences with respect to the baseline would entail performing 
an assessment of the uncertainty of the projections in all the different scenarios, in addition to the one performed 
around the baseline. We leave this for future research. While being somewhat loose from a statistical perspective, the 
graphical analysis shown here gives a pretty good idea of the “economic significance” of the different results, and 
is a big improvement on the state of the art of simulation modelling (see our companion paper for a more in- depth 
discussion on this point).
Table 5. Family- policies related parameters, baseline scenario
On leave benefits Public childcare expenditures per child Part- time
Age of child
0 1 2 3
# weeks 2009 US$ PPP %
Greece (EL) 15 154 293 432 571 7.6
Spain (ES) 24 129 1,561 2,996 4,431 12
Hungary (HU) 74 48 78 108 3,045 3.9
Ireland (IE) 12.4 0 0 0 9,384 20.2
Italy (IT) 25 1,017 2,043 3,540 5,286 15.3
Sweden (SE) 74 1,541 2,586 3,630 9,042 24.4
Source: OECD Family Database.
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they would approach, by the end of the fore-
casting horizon, participation rates close to 80%, 
not far away from the near 90% value projected 
for Sweden (see Table 6).
Note that the result that behaviour matters 
more than individual characteristics in explaining 
the participation gap does not mean that the 
characteristics of the female population in the 
low- participation countries are similar to those 
of the Swedish population (they are not): what 
our analysis shows is that these differences do 
not matter much, as Swedish women participate 
more regardless of their attributes.
Indeed, endowing the low- participation 
countries with Swedish demography or Swedish 
education leads only to minor changes in partici-
pation rates. In particular, demography is actually 
helping Hungary and – up to around 2030 – Spain, 
in driving up participation rates with respect to 
Sweden, as can be seen by the fact that the 
projections for the Swedish demography scenario 
lie below the baseline. Differences in educational 
attainments play a role in explaining the partic-
ipation gap with respect to Sweden, albeit rela-
tively small (up to 2–3 ppt, 5 ppt in Italy), and 
concentrated in the second half of the simulation 
horizon, when the new hypothetical “Swedish like” cohorts will have replaced the old population.
The picture changes dramatically when focusing on the younger cohorts in childbearing years, 
where the participation gap with respect to Sweden is less pronounced (Table 7), except in Greece.
The impact of the different drivers on the participation rates in this age group is shown in Figure 3. 
With the exception of Hungary, projections in the Swedish participation scenario for the 20–44 age 
group lie below the baseline, meaning that the conditional behaviour of younger women is not too 
different from their counterparts in Sweden, and if anything even more favourable to participation. 
Turning to differences in individual characteristics (the composition effect), Figure 3 shows that the 
lower educational attainments are responsible, as in the 20–64 years population, only for a small 
part of the participation gap (up to 2–3 ppt in all countries except Italy, where the participation rate 
would be five ppt higher, in the middle of the forecasting horizon, if women had the same educational 
attainments as in Sweden).11 Moreover, demography in this age group plays slightly in favour of low- 
participation countries, especially in the first part of the forecasting exercise (up to 2030). This is due 
to the fact that fertility rates are lower in these countries, hence the age distribution is more biased 
towards later ages (in the 20–44 years range), where participation is typically higher.
What other determinants are then responsible for the participation gap? In the participation equa-
tion, the only other individual characteristics considered are household composition, and participation 
and employment history (Table 1). However, the share of women in the 20–44 years old age range 
that are living in a union is higher in Sweden than in all other countries under analysis, so differences 
in household composition, if anything, play a role in attenuating the participation gap, rather than in 
explaining it. Part of the answer has to be found in the path persistent dynamics of participation itself: 
in Sweden it is easier to find employment; women are encouraged to participate in the labour market, 
even if only marginally, from an early age, and re- entry after maternity leave is facilitated. This has 
dynamic consequences as attachment to the labour market increases even at later ages.
To summarise our main findings so far, the low female participation rates in the countries under 
analysis can be explained mainly by an adverse behaviour of older women (even after controlling for 
differences in individual characteristics). Moreover, the behaviour of younger women is not detri-
mental to participation, their lower educational attainments are only partly responsible for the partic-
ipation gap, and demography doesn’t help either in explaining it. The last source of the participation 
Table 6. Participation rates and participation 
gaps with respect to Sweden, female population 
aged 20–64 years, baseline scenario
Females (20–64 years old)
Year 2013 2020 2030 2040 2050
Participation rates (%)
Sweden 86.4 88.3 89.6 89.4 89.7
Spain 70.9 72.3 71.8 73.3 75.5
Hungary 65.1 66.8 70.2 71.3 71.3
Ireland 62.8 69.5 69.6 69.6 72
Greece 62.4 64.1 67.1 70 73
Italy 59.0 63.3 64.7 67 68.8
Participation gap w.r.t. Sweden (%)
Spain 15.5 16.0 17.8 16.1 14.2
Hungary 21.3 21.5 19.4 18.1 18.4
Ireland 23.6 18.8 20.0 19.8 17.7
Greece 24.0 24.2 22.5 19.4 16.7
Italy 27.4 25.0 24.9 22.4 20.9
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gap for women in childbearing years – in the model – is the role of family- friendly policies, and in 
particular the presence of public, affordable childcare, maternity leave, and part- time opportunities. 
As it turns out, inadequate family policies and part- time opportunities are important determinants of 
the low participation rates of younger women, thus completing our picture of the causes of the female 
Figure 2 . Participation rates in the baseline drivers scenarios, female population aged 20–64 years. The shaded 
areas are the estimated densities of the baseline projections, computed over 1,000 replications with bootstrapped 
values of the coefficients.
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participation gap: in short (and with some inevi-
table simplification) it is the adverse behaviour of 
older women, and insufficient policies and lack of 
opportunities for younger women.
The next section explores the impact of the 
family policy variables, together with policies 
aimed at increasing labour force participation 
at later ages by closing down opportunities for 
early retirement, and policies aimed at supporting 
aggregate demand, hence a faster recovery from 
the Great Recession.
5. Results. The policy actions 
scenarios
Figure 4 is the analogue of Figure 2 for the policy 
actions scenarios. It shows, for each country, 
the projections for female participation rates 
in the age group 20–64 years, in the Enhanced 
family policies, No early retirement and Delayed 
recovery scenarios, against the background of the 
baseline. With the exception of Greece, where 
abolishing early retirements has an impact on 
aggregate participation rates of about two ppt in 
the mid 2020s, the only detectable effects at an 
aggregate level come from the Enhanced family 
policy scenario, with an increase in female participation rates that goes from 1 to 3 ppt. No further 
gains can be obtained, according to these projections, in Sweden. This is consistent with the findings 
of the previous section, as we pointed out that differences in conditional behaviour of women explain 
almost entirely, in the aggregate, the participation gap.
Moreover, the fact that these effects are small should be of no surprise, given that some of the 
policies have an impact on specific segments of the population only: in particular, childcare benefits 
and paid maternity leave are only relevant for mothers in childbearing years, for whom part- time 
opportunities also matter, while the abolition of early retirement options impacts only individuals who 
Table 7. Participation rates and participation 
gaps with respect to Sweden, female population 
aged 20–44 years, baseline scenario
Females (20–44 years old)
Year 2013 2020 2030 2040 2050
Participation rates (%)
Sweden 84.2 84.6 86.1 85.1 85.6
Spain 76.8 77.5 73.8 74.5 76.5
Hungary 71.7 73.7 74.3 74.1 74.6
Ireland 68.1 74.4 69.3 68.9 73.6
Greece 66.2 64.1 63.3 62.7 62.1
Italy 64.7 70.8 71.2 71.1 72.1
Participation gap w.r.t. Sweden (%)
Spain 9.6 10.8 15.8 14.9 13.2
Hungary 14.7 14.6 15.3 15.3 15.1
Ireland 18.3 13.9 20.3 20.5 16.1
Greece 20.2 24.2 26.3 26.7 27.6
Italy 21.7 17.5 18.4 18.3 17.6
Figure 3 . Participation rates in the baseline drivers scenarios, female population aged 20–44 years. The shaded 
areas are the estimated densities of the baseline projections, computed over 1,000 replications with bootstrapped 
values of the coefficients.
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would otherwise retire before the new minimum retirement age. Accordingly, in the next sections we 
investigate the impact of the different scenarios in the most relevant subgroups of the population.
5.1. The enhanced family policies scenario
Figure 5 depicts projected participation rates in the Enhanced family policies scenario for mothers 
aged 20–44 years with children aged 0–12 years. For each country, we report participation rates sepa-
rately for women with high and low education, against their respective baseline trends11. In all coun-
tries except Sweden, improving the family policies increases participation rates for women with low 
education by about 10 ppt, a remarkable amount. Even in Sweden, where participation rates are very 
high to start with, increasing childcare, on leave periods and part- time opportunities by 20% would 
increase the participation rate women with low education from about 95% to about 97%. Gains for 
highly educated women are more limited but still substantial, except in Hungary where both high and 
low educated women experience similar magnitudes of increase in participation.
Finally, we explore the individual contributions of the different policies in the Enhanced family 
policy scenario: public childcare, maternity leave, and availability of part- time. For the sake of brevity, 
11. Results for Hungary are subject to more oscillation due to sample variability in the original EU- SILC data.
Figure 4 . Participation rates in the policy actions scenarios, female population aged 20–64 years. The shaded 
areas are the estimated densities of the baseline projections, computed over 1,000 replications with bootstrapped 
values of the coefficients.
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in presenting the results we focus on the most vulnerable group, in terms of participation: women 
(aged 20–44 years) with children (aged 0–12 years) and a low education. Figure 6 shows the effects 
of an increase of 20% in the values of each of these three scenario variables, separately. All variables 
have an effect, though it is their combination that drives participation rates up to the levels analysed 
above. In most countries, and in particular in Spain and Hungary, it is an increase in the duration of 
paid parental leave that is deemed to have the bigger effect (though the effects are generally so close 
that any difference is likely not to be robust to statistical testing). This is not surprising as maternity 
leave allows women to remain formally employed while taking care of their children.
5.2. The no early retirement and the delayed recovery scenarios
Finally, we investigate the effects of the No early retirement and Delayed recovery scenarios in the 
sub- population of interest. Figure 7 reports the increase in the employment rate with respect to the 
baseline, due to a hypothetical minimum effective retirement age of 60 years old, both for males and 
females. The policy is evaluated on the population in the 50–59 age group. Despite the aggregate 
effects of this policy being negligible (see Figure  4) due to the relatively small size of the group 
of affected individuals, the effects on this sub- population are substantial, with an increase in the 
employment rate that peaks at almost 6 ppt in Greece, about 4 ppt in Hungary and Italy, and 2 ppt 
in Spain. The effects of raising the minimum effective retirement age obviously decline over time, as 
Figure 5 . Enhanced family policies scenario: public childcare benefits, duration of maternity leave and availability 
of part- time employment are jointly increased by 20%. Participation rates by educational attainments, female 
population aged 20–44 years not in education. The shaded areas are the estimated densities of the baseline 
projections, computed over 1,000 replications with bootstrapped values of the coefficients.
 Research article Labour supply and demand
Richardson et al. International Journal of Microsimulation 2019; 12(2) DOI: https:// doi. org/ 10. 34196/ ijm. 00201 62 of 66
the average retirement age is expected to increase even without this additional policy – hence, the 
number of people that are affected, and would otherwise consider retiring before the newly imposed 
minimum retirement age, diminishes.
As for what concerns the sensitivity of our results to the assumptions about the path of recovery 
from the crisis, Figure 8 shows that slowing down the recovery by 10 years reduces employment rates 
by about 3 ppt in Ireland, Spain and Greece, while smaller effects are expected elsewhere. These are 
the countries where the unemployment rate increases the most, with respect to the pre- crisis levels).
6. Conclusions
Against a baseline scenario plotting a general trend of increasing participation rates towards the 
very high Swedish levels, where however Sweden will not be joined by any other country in meeting 
the Europe 2020 target, we have presented alternative scenarios aimed at understanding the drivers 
of the baseline results, and the expected effects of policies aimed at increasing participation and 
employment.
We argue that the low female participation rates in Italy, Spain, Greece, Hungary and Ireland, with 
respect to Sweden, are due to (i) low participation of older women, (ii), inadequate family policies 
and limited opportunities for family- work conciliation for younger women. According to our model, 
education plays a limited role, as older women with high education also participate little, and younger 
women in childbearing years are constrained by factors other than their level of education. An increase 
in the minimum retirement age is effective in keeping more women close to retirement in the labour 
force: however, due to the small number of women affected, the aggregate effects are small. Finally, 
a prolonged state of labour market distress due to the consequences of the Great Recession would 
push countries further away from the Europe 2020 targets, though again a lack of aggregate demand 
is not a primary explanation for the low observed female participation rates, and their incomplete 
projected convergence to the Swedish benchmark.
In fact, in the so called ‘baseline drivers’ alternative scenarios, by endowing low participation coun-
tries with ‘Swedish features’, possibly involving extreme, highly hypothetical departures from the base-
line parameters, we learn that the gap in female participation with respect to Sweden is explained 
mostly by differences in the individual conditional behaviour, rather than in the composition of the 
population by age and education. Interestingly, this result turns out to be driven by older cohorts, i.e. 
people aged 45 years or more in the initial population. The conditional behaviour of younger women 
is not too different from their counterparts in Sweden, and if anything it is even more favourable 
Figure 6 . Decomposition of the Enhanced family policies scenario: public childcare benefits, duration of 
maternity leave and availability of part- time employment are separately increased by 20%. Participation rates, 
female population aged 20–44 years with children aged 0–12 years and low education. The shaded areas are the 
estimated densities of the baseline projections, computed over 1,000 replications with bootstrapped values of the 
coefficients.
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to participation. Putting it differently, this indicates that there is not much room for manoeuvre to 
increase participation through higher education, and little can be done about the effect of choices 
made far in the past by older cohorts of women regarding their participation in the labour market.
Indeed, population ageing is a powerful as well as ‘automatic’ driver of participation, given that 
older cohorts tend to participate less, notwithstanding policies aimed at raising retirement age and 
Figure 7. No early retirement scenario: minimum effective retirement age is 60 years old. Employment rates, 
differential to baseline, population aged 50–59 years.
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creating incentives to extend their permanence in the labour force. Whilst population ageing might 
well create important labour supply shortages in the future, differences in the demographic trends 
cannot explain the incomplete and inadequate expected convergence to Swedish participation rates. 
Indeed, as many low- participation countries in the past few decades have experienced a stronger 
demographic transition than Sweden, with dramatic shrinkage of their younger cohorts, demographic 
evolution will contribute positively to convergence, as the relatively larger older cohorts, character-
ised by low participation rates, will gradually exit working age.
With respect to education not being an important policy lever to increase participation – a somehow 
counterintuitive result – it should be noted that this is consistent with the literature, which finds a 
significant effect of education on participation, but does not identify education policies as a key area 
of intervention (Jaumotte, 2004; Thévenon, 2013). Education matters a lot in explaining current 
participation levels of the older cohorts, as older women with low education often never considered 
entering the labour force, and is still significant in explaining current participation levels of younger 
generations because of the lower returns women with low education can expect from their participa-
tion in the labour market, both in terms of a lower probability of finding a job and lower wages. At the 
same time, education is less relevant for explaining future participation changes because (i) younger 
women in low- participation countries have already closed most of their education gap, with respect 
to benchmark countries like Sweden, and (ii) the premium that education commands with respect to 
unemployment and pay for younger women has also shrunk, partly due to increasing work insecurity 
and labour market dualisation, with young women getting a disproportionate share of ‘bad’ jobs, 
irrespective of their education level (Berton et al., 2012).
The reason for persistently low participation of prime age women has therefore to be found in the 
economic and institutional environment in which they live: our model highlights that inadequate family 
policies and part- time opportunities are important determinants of the observed and projected low 
participation rates. This is consistent with the findings of the literature, which point to the importance 
of flexibility of working- time arrangements and support to families with young children (ILO- IMF- 
OECD- WBG, 2014) as key policy drivers of female participation rates.
Indeed, there is a whole set of family friendly policies that would be desirable but are not imple-
mented to a sufficient degree, because of - but not solely due to - budgetary constraints imposed 
by austerity. In particular, in our “policy actions” alternative scenarios, we have discussed two sets of 
family- work conciliation policies: first, policies that would facilitate women to perform both family and 
labour market related tasks (part time work, maternity leave); second, those that would allow women 
to access services provided by professionals that could substitute them in several basic care tasks 
(public childcare, but also elderly care or subsidies to families in order for them to hire caregivers).
Figure 8. Delayed recovery scenario: the effects of the Great Recession fade away at a slower pace; complete 
recovery is achieved 10 years later than in the baseline (so 2040 in Greece and 2030 in other countries). 
Employment rates, differential to baseline, population aged 20–64.
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The first set of policies (part time jobs and parental leave) has the downside to detach women – at 
least partially – from the labour market, with the risk of not being able to revert in the future to full 
participation. Moreover, such policies require cooperation on the side of firms, which should accom-
modate (costly) part timers and on- leave mothers without penalizing their career. Incentives and 
support from the Governments are clearly needed to achieve this goal. For instance, most Swedish 
companies are flexible regarding parental duties, and employees still get 80 per cent of their pay 
when they have to stay home with sick children or dependents. Yet, this does not happen at the 
expense of productivity: Sweden ranks ninth in the Global Competitiveness Index 2015–2016 (Ireland 
is 24th Spain 33rd, Italy 43rd, Hungary 63rd and Greece 81st; see Schwab, 2015).
Our reference country, Sweden, is also a leading example for parental leave policies. In Sweden, 
parents are entitled to 480 days of paid parental leave when a child is born or adopted. For 390 days, 
parents are entitled to nearly 80 per cent of their normal pay, up to a ceiling; the remaining 90 days 
are paid at a flat rate; those who are not in employment are also entitled to paid parental leave. The 
measure is financed to a large extent by employers’ contributions and for the remaining part (about 
a quarter) by general taxation. Parental leave can be taken up until a child turns eight years old. 
The leave entitlement applies to each child (except in the case of multiple births), so parents can 
accumulate leave from several children. In this period, parents also have the legal right to reduce 
their normal working hours by up to 25%. The duration of parental leave in Sweden is very high by 
international standards and is perhaps Sweden’s most famous argument when it comes to being a 
child- friendly system. Generous parental leave is not sufficient by itself though, to ensure a family- 
work balance. Hungary provides even longer periods of parental leave: 156 weeks for either parent, 
with cash benefits totalling 70% of previous earnings, up to a ceiling, for insured parents in the first 
104 weeks, and flat rate benefits for non- insured parents or for insured parents in the last 52 weeks 
(Addati et al., 2014). However, participation rates in Hungary are among the lowest in Europe, and 
are projected to grow only at a comparatively slow rate. The reason is that parental leave can backfire 
when gender equality is not firmly rooted in the workplace, as women might lose their attachment to 
the labour force, or end up being discriminated against. It is difficult to separate the directions of the 
causal link between attitudes and behaviours, a positive attitude towards female participation being 
both a prerequisite and a consequence of increased female participation. However, policies aimed 
at promoting gender equality favour both. In Sweden, for instance, each parent has two months of 
paid parental leave reserved exclusively for him or her. Should a father – or a mother for that matter 
– decide not to take them, they cannot be transferred to the partner. 85% of Swedish fathers take 
parental leave, and men in Sweden take nearly a quarter of all parental leave. Those who don’t take 
the leave face questions from family, friends and colleagues. And in an effort to further improve these 
figures, the government provides a gender equality bonus, consisting of an extra daily payment if 270 
days of the paid parental leave are divided evenly between the mother and the father.
The second set of policies (child care services and subsidies) has fewer downsides regarding the risk 
of detaching women from the labour market, but is more costly for the public budget and requires a 
strong political will to engage in long- term investments aimed at empowering women and sustaining 
families. In our reference country, Sweden, public childcare is guaranteed to all parents and it oper-
ates on a whole- day basis: most childcare facilities are open from 6.30 a.m. until 6.30 p.m. Pre- school 
is free for children aged between three and six years old for up to 15 hours per week. Aside from 
paid leave, the government provides an additional monthly child allowance until a child reaches the 
age of 16 years old, which covers the cost of additional childcare in pre- school years. Education for 
children aged six years old to university level is free of charge. The list of family friendly policies could 
proceed further. In 2010, for instance, the Swedish government introduced a new rule into its social 
insurance scheme to help single parents who fall ill and cannot look after their child. The rule allows 
another insured person (i.e. a person legally living and/or working in Sweden) who forgoes paid work 
to receive temporary parental benefits to look after the child. Low income parents may be entitled to 
a housing allowance. Parents pushing infants and toddlers in prams and pushchairs can ride for free 
on public buses. All in all, the government is an active player in structuring the whole society around 
the needs of young families.
In conclusion, our study points to the prominent role of family policies: what is needed is not 
a change of behaviour on the part of women (which has already happened), nor a rebalancing of 
the demographic structure (which will inevitably happen), but a change of mentality on the side of 
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institutions and firms, which could prompt much needed further changes in the role of women in our 
societies at large.
As for what regards the directions for future research, at least two avenues seem promising, given 
the results achieved by the present study. First, the microsimulation analysis could be extended to all 
European member states, with the purpose of providing a scoreboard of indicators and scenarios of 
projected participation rates, extending the rather limited analysis by sub- groups of the population 
in existing studies. Second, the model could be extended to include income dynamics, allowing for 
more distributional analysis, for instance with respect to inequality and poverty. Finally, a more prom-
ising, as well as challenging one, would be to design a structural labour supply model based on a 
tax- benefit model (EUROMOD), by country.
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